Improvement of rice productivity is a critical issue in Asian monsoon regions as well as in Japan where the average area managed by each farmer is less than one hectare ha and has hardly increased in many years To encourage a good farm management situation agricultural policy is now focusing on an acceleration of farmland rental transactions FRT along with paddy field consolidation PC projects More than of the agricultural budget has been spent on PC projects in Japan Consequently of all paddy fields have been consolidated from small fields of irregular shape to efficient fields endowed National Institute for Rural Engineering The author is grateful to Drs Shinichi Shogenji and Yasuhiro Nakashima of the University of Tokyo for many valuable discussions during the course of this work sponsored by the Japan Institute of Irrigation and Drainage with standardized large parcels of farmland over ha irrigation and drainage canals and branch roads It is now necessary to evaluate the effects of this cumulative investment capital in view of policy accountability Ideally PC projects have two effects The first effect is improvement of agricultural productivity by modernization of agriculture with large agricultural machinery high flexibility of water management and improvement of less fertile soil This effect is revealed by a high rental rate as a shadow price of farmland through the process of increasing farmland quality The second effect is realized as economies of scale in rice production from accelerating intensive farmland use by efficient large scale farmers Because PC projects break old farmland ownership structures and establish new ownership or usage rights implementation of these projects stimulates FRT even though ownership of paddy fields belongs to small scale farmers Empirical studies are needed to show not only a rise in the rental rate related to the improvement of productivity but also an increase in the area managed by efficient farmers through FRT In previous studies a hedonic price approach was used to show relations between farmland value and several factors such as soil characteristics Elad Clifton and Epperson urbanization Plantinga and Miller and site characteristics Xu Mittelhammer and Barkley Boisvert Schmit Regmi
Unfortunately there are few hedonic analyses of Japanese farmland because of limited availability of data Japanese farmland purchase and FRT have been restricted by local governments to protect the property rights of farmers so data with enough variance for empirical analysis cannot be obtained from agricultural statistics There are also few economic data classified by consolidation situations or supply and demand S D conditions for renting Estimation from S D equilibria data would cause identification problems Even if distinct data were available the data of the restricted market would distort estimation results
Another option is to estimate the farmland production function In fact several previous studies estimated aggregate production functions showing a low elasticity of farmland with regard to the rental rate Nakashima Godo Ito Kuroda and Abdullah However the aggregate production function can hardly represent individual farmer reactions as seen in FRT and can hardly treat differences between farmers such as technological gaps Since different types of decision making are the driving force of renting even if other management situations are the same consideration of technological gaps is important for the analysis of FRT Moreover there is no room to include PC projects into estimation of production function because of the multi co linearity and data limitation
The purpose of this study is to analyze FRT and evaluate the effects of PC projects by modeling both supply and demand sides of farmland renting with micro data The central concern of this study is whether large scale farmers supposed to be the demand side increase their farmland through FRT with PC projects to achieve economies of scale in rice production To overcome restricted market conditions in data the discrete choice model was employed to estimate the S D functions in FRT and effects of PC projects on ideal S D equilibria were simulated Unlike the common discrete choice model the basic equation of this model was derived from the stochastic production function not a speculative utility function involving the technological gaps between farmers
In the following sections the model and data are explained in detail and then the estimation and simulation results are presented The final section contains a summary of our findings and the implications of stimulating FRT To obtain micro data with enough variance a discrete choice type questionnaire was administered to individual farmers The question to supply side farmers was If you had a chance to rent one parcel of paddy field dA to another farmer would you accept the rental rate B s yen ha year Demand side farmers were asked the following question If you had a chance to rent one parcel of paddy field dA from another farmer would you pay the rental rate B d yen ha year Assume that you could use other agricultural machinery in addition to your own and employ help to cultivate the field if needed Also assume that the obligation rate of the set aside program is equal to the average rate for your town In Japanese rice production the number of demand side farmers is far fewer than supply side farmers although areas rented by a demand side farmer are larger than areas of a supply side farmer Hence the estimation error of the demand function is larger due to a smaller amount of data To improve statistical efficiency a double bounded question was employed Hanemann Loomis and Kanninen A second question that depended on the response to the first question was as follows If you accept the above situation will you pay a higher rental rate B which was higher or lower by one rank than the first bidding rate according to the above rate order including and thousand yen ha year Each value was proposed to each group of farmers randomly assigned to one of five equal groups Questions to the S D farmers were about both N CF paddy fields in poor condition before the PC project and CF paddy fields in improved condition after the project Thus four kinds of data were collected i e supply or demand side N CF or CF A simple yes no answer was requested of the S D farmers to duplicate the actual FRT It would have been possible to let the respondents write the acceptable price numerically or to select their preference from prelisted values If the respondents had been allowed to answer in these ways they would not have indicated the border value that they actually wanted to pay or receive Instead they would have most likely answered in accordance with the value that the local governments proposed as the standard rental rate causing a lack of variance in data The empirical model employed here consists of i the S D functions that show farmer decisions about renting based on individual differences in production conditions and ii the specification of the S D equilibria as ideal rental agreements In previous analyses a stochastic production function was proposed to take account of individual differences between farmers Kumbhakar Chambers and Quiggin
These analyses required a convergence process which sometimes failed in function estimation to identify intangible differences In this study the S D rental functions were directly estimated to duplicate farmer responses for FRT after deriving these functions from the stochastic production function and modifying them to the discrete choice model in order to use hypothetical questionnaire data Godo derived the restricted profit function from the assumption that each farmer decides their production level under given farmland area In addition to his assumption the total factor productivity is assumed to be increased in accordance with an increase of management scale because large scale farmers can use effective production methods embodied with agricultural machines and agricultural chemicals Then rice production Q of each farmer is defined by the production Q F A V E u with predetermined farmland A other input factors V and social and geographical influences E Here and subsequently bold characters show the vector Variable u is the stochastic element that represents technological gaps between farmers relating to differences in skills and knowledge of individual farmers quality of inherited farmland and ability to analyze information from consumers The existence of technological gaps yields different profits even if farmers have the same management resources Given that they try to maximize profit R PQ PAA PVV under the technical constraints of the production function the first order condition with regard to V is PV P Q V where PV is the price of V and P is the price of rice Because A is uncontrollable for farmers the optimum rental rate PA WTP differs between farmers with different production situations Assuming that this optimum rental rate PA WTP willingly paid by individual farmers is decided as satisfying R A and V is replaced by PV according to the first order condition PA WTP can be defined as PA WTP 
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The signs of A PA PA A in both S D sides cannot be determined in advance because the sign of PA A relates not only to the parameter b of diminishing returns but also to the total factor productivity a in Eq If total factor productivity changes in proportion to A the effect of diminishing returns may be overwhelmed PA A and the sign of A probably corresponds to the sign of PA The acceptance probabilities in Eqs and correspond to the percentage in numbers of farmers who accept the proposed rental rate regarding one farm parcel of dA ha in FRT Since all parcels of farmland are assumed to be the same standard size an acceptance probability corresponds to the percentage of rented farmland parcels and consequently the percentage of rented farmland areas in the current transactions
The ideal equilibrium of the S D sides is defined at the intersection of the S D functions At this point the equilibrium rental rate B and area rented N dA are decided as N dA Pr B P In other words small scale farmers can make only one bid to rent a field while large scale farmers can make n bids at the same price From this assumption the ratio n corresponds to the ratio N s N d
Then the rental agreement level can be defined as
Here X shows the average value of the explanatory variables and the probability terms are replaced with the acceptance probability functions assuming that the distribution of all related farmers on each side is consistent
In order to simplify and clarify the achievement of large scale farmers in FRT with PC projects both S D sides were a priori classified according to their management scale The supply side was assumed to be small scale farmers who managed farms of less than ha and the demand side was assumed to be large scale farmers who managed farms Questionnaires were distributed to all farmers on site when the total site area was less than ha In the case of more than ha one gathered area of about ha were selected for survey within the project site and questionnaires were distributed to all farmers in this area of ha or more These divisions of ha were based on an official notice from the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fishery MAFF to the farmers as a necessary condition for project implementation If farmers were to be subsidized for the PC project they had to list representative large scale farmers who satisfied the necessary condition of over ha under their management In fact the survey result on consolidated paddy fields JIID shows that of large scale farmers classified by ha have already rented fields from other farmers whereas only of small scale farmers have rented from others Considering these figures it can be supposed that small scale farmers are mostly the supply side and large scale farmers are the demand side in general
The cross sectional data came from the survey of farmers conducted by JIID with assistance from MAFF in December JIID A total of research sites were selected throughout Japan excluding Hokkaido and Okinawa where management styles and rice varieties are different from those of other regions The average project area was over ha of paddy fields and all projects were implemented by local governments according to a standard design showing almost the same physical paddy field situations Table
The questionnaires were distributed to farmers who owned paddy fields consolidated by PC projects two years before the survey The results of the survey are shown in Table  In terms of effective answers average values of measurement variables such as farmland area under single farmer management The prices of agricultural machinery fertilizers and pesticides were not included as candidates because these prices corresponded to nationwide market prices and varied little between farmers unified by the constant of the equation Table shows estimations of the S D functions in both N CF and CF respectively The t statistic at the level was used to exclude insignificant variables Coefficients of the proposed rental rate in both tables were significant and indicated theoretically expected signs A comparison of N CF and CF shows that coefficients of rental rate in CF were greater than N CF in both S D sides Clearly both S D farmers reacted to rental rates more sharply after the PC projects indicating lower in Eqs and These changes are shown more concretely by the rental rate elasticity of acceptance probability at the indifferent point where acceptance probability corresponds to
The elasticity values for N CF were supply and demand and those for CF were supply and demand Both S D elasticity values for CF were higher than for N CF but all values were less than indicating inelasticity An inelastic structure in derived demand for farmland was also shown in previous studies on the estimated aggregate cost function or production function A positive estimated coefficient of each variable except the price variable the proposed rate in our case will shift both S and D functions to the right in the price quantity graph increasing acceptance probabilities If the probability is held constant this shift tends to decrease or increase the price in supply or demand because the inclination of the probability function is positive or Fraction of correct prediction Note Significant at level at level The probability function G was assumed to obey the logistic distribution in this case The same tendency was found in the case of normal distribution function negative A negative coefficient has reverse effects From the signs in Table  the higher price of rice and lower wages encouraged both S D farmers to easily accept a high rental rate in spite of different signs of coefficients for the estimated equations Farmland area A had a negative effect on supply and a positive effect on demand As discussed in the earlier section the coefficient of this variable can take a positive or negative sign but should take opposite signs for supply and demand Therefore the estimation results corresponded to the theoretical framework Estimated coefficients of geographical classification show that supply side farmers in suburban areas SUA tended to rent their paddy fields at a high rental rate This was because the rental rate was raised by farmers hoping the land would soon be bought by developers Shogenji However the situation was the reverse in less favored areas LFA showing that farmers are easily willing to accept a low rental rate for their land show the ideal equilibria of FRT in N CF and CF respectively Comparing points A and B reveals that the rental rate increased by four times and the rental agreement level increased by due to the PC projects Point C shows the supply effect in which the demand function was stable while the supply function shifted after the projects A comparison of points C and A clearly shows that PC projects raised the rental rate and decreased the rental agreement level on the supply side This was because of the increased incentive to small scale farmers restarting cultivation of their own paddy fields when productivity of their paddy fields was increased by the projects JIID Furthermore the burden of PC project costs made it impossible to rent paddy fields to others at a low rental rate Tanada Meanwhile a comparison of points A and D showing the demand effect only indicates a large increase in both rental rate and rental agreement level This was because large scale farmers could attain efficient production after the projects Consequently the projects greatly increased the rental rate due to the interaction of S D effects and moderately increased the rental agreement level as the positive demand effect more than offset the negative supply effect Table  calculated from the mean value of the explanatory variables in each region reveals that the order of simulated rental rates almost corresponded to the order of actual values Most of the agreement levels simulated were almost the same as the actual values except for Tokai These results indicate that our model conforms well to the evidence Interestingly all rental rates increased strongly after the projects especially in Tohoku Kanto and Hokuriku and all agreement levels increased moderately especially in Tokai Kinki Chu Shikoku and Hokuriku On the whole the eastern part of Japan including Tohoku Kanto and Hokuriku showed strong project effects on rental rates rather than rental agreement levels while the western part of Japan tended to show strong project effects on rental agreement levels rather than rental rates In Table  all simulated rental rates i e ideal equilibrium values were lower than the actual values in both cases especially in N CF while in five out of seven regions the rental agreement level in the CF simulation was higher than the rate of actual level These disparities indicate economic inefficiency caused by regulation of the government and mutual maladjustment of farmers in actual renting However the disparity between the ideal value and actual value was far lower in CF than in N CF It can be said that PC projects reduced economic inefficiency in the rental market Table  shows the influences of low rice price high wages and geographical situation on project effects The low price of rice and the high wage rate caused low rental rates and low agreement levels in both CF and N CF remarkably so in CF As a result the effects of PC projects shown by the difference between N CF and CF in rental rate were lower than the status quo in the case of a decrease in profit of rice production relating to the price of rice and wage especially in a lower price of rice In terms of geographical situation project effects on the rental rate in SUA were higher but effects on rental agreement levels in SUA were lower than other areas Meanwhile the effects in LFA appeared as a rise in the rental agreement level rather than in the rental rate
In order to reallocate farmland to efficient farmers improvement in Farmland Rental Transactions FRT cooperating with Paddy field Consolidation PC projects is one of the most important policy issues in Asian monsoon regions as well as in Japan This study analyzed FRT under a regulated market and evaluated the effect of PC projects by modeling both supply and demand sides of farmland renting with micro data from a discrete choice type questionnaire One remarkable result is that PC projects appeared to cause a marked increase in the rental rate due to the interaction of S D effects and caused a moderate increase in the rental agreement level due to a negative effect on the supply side overwhelmed by a stronger positive effect on the demand side A second result is evidence of economic inefficiency that was caused by regulation of the government and maladjustment of farmers This may have increased transaction costs in the actual rental market However inefficiency can be reduced by the PC project stimulating major changes in farmland conditions and providing incentive to farmers to rent their farmland from others The third result is that regional differences in agricultural and social situations led to regional differences in project effects Effects in the eastern part of Japan tended to appear as high rental rates because both S D farmers had a strong desire to continue their cultivation supported by the high price and monoculture of rice Meanwhile the project effects in the western part of Japan appeared through an increase in the rental agreement level because the small average farmland area and large varieties of crops made it easy for farmers to rent their paddy fields to other farmers Finally a decrease in the price of rice reduced project effects This may be a dilemma because PC projects are needed to improve rice productivity whereas a decrease in rice price due to high rice productivity results in negative effects of the PC projects Furthermore a change in the project site from suburban areas to less favored areas makes the project effect appear in the rental agreement level rather than the rental rate This suggests that PC projects can effectively prevent farmland abandonment caused by a lack of demand for rental farmland in less favored areas
From above findings we can conclude that applying the discrete choice model to a regulated market is useful for analyzing the capitalization mechanisms of PC projects and evaluating causative factors in FRT Given that the agricultural sector is subject to regulations in many dimensions this model may be applicable to other analyses such as the price of water which has not been evaluated empirically but constitutes an important factor in agricultural production effects of public investment in dry fields and FRT in other countries Nevertheless there is a need for further investigation such as the application of other distribution functions to the model improvement of questionnaire items and a test for homogeneity in the regional market structure This paper draws heavily on Kunimitsu Farmland areas consolidated by PC projects were shown by Wagakuni Nochi no Genjyo Sit uations of Recent Consolidated Farmland MAFF Estimations for the production functions ignored technological gaps between farmers and assumed the same production structure of each farmer because technological gaps were rarely measured in the actual statistics However the estimations without consideration of technological gaps differed from production frontiers and included biases as mentioned by Kumbhakar According to the data on site the rate n is approximately eight on average That is one large scale demand side rented from eight small scale farmers supply side This rate differs between sites in the project but appears stable for many years due to little entry or exit of farmers Therefore rate n rarely affects equilibrium values even in actual transactions The actual rental market may be too small to ensure market equilibrium but Rustichini Satterthwaite and Williams showed that the indeterminacy or inefficiency caused by trader bargaining behavior in a small market vanishes rapidly under a uniform price double auction with more than six or three traders per side Elasticity in this paper is different from that in the conventional production function but the following features were found if this point was ignored for the comparison That is the elasticity for factor demand for paddy fields estimated by Ito during the period was for small scale farmers and for large scale farmers These values are similar to the estimation values calculated in this study for Godo also showed that the value of elasticity for large scale farmers was larger than that for small scale farmers Many cooperative agricultural production groups were established in the Tokai region and their management area exceeded the project site The large area under cultivation makes the number of data lower than in other regions Therefore the actual value of the area rented in Table has some limitations Many researchers pointed out the probability of obstacle for rental transactions which relate to the institutional regulation in notification of rental transactions to the local committee and costs of searching for lenders Hayami and Godo 
